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Abstract
We study the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism, that is widely used to
allocate divisible resources. Each agent submits a bid for each divisible resource and receives a
fraction proportional to her bids. We quantify the inefficiency of Nash equilibria by studying
the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the induced game under complete and incomplete information.
When agents’ valuations are concave, we show that the Bayesian Nash equilibria can be arbi-
trarily inefficient, in contrast to the well-known 4/3 bound for pure equilibria [12]. Next, we
upper bound the PoA over Bayesian equilibria by 2 when agents’ valuations are subadditive,
generalizing and strengthening previous bounds on lattice submodular valuations. Furthermore,
we show that this bound is tight and cannot be improved by any simple or scale-free mechanism.
Then we switch to settings with budget constraints, and we show an improved upper bound on
the PoA over coarse-correlated equilibria. Finally, we prove that the PoA is exactly 2 for pure
equilibria in the polyhedral environment.
1 Introduction
Allocating network resources, like bandwidth, among agents is a canonical problem in the network
optimization literature. A traditional model for this problem was proposed by Kelly [14], where
allocating these infinitely divisible resources is treated as a market with prices. More precisely,
agents in the system submit bids on resources to express their willingness to pay. After soliciting
the bids, the system manager prices each resource with an amount equal to the sum of bids on it.
Then the agents buy portions of resources proportional to their bids by paying the corresponding
prices. This mechanism is known as the proportional allocation mechanism or Kelly’s mechanism
in the literature.
The proportional allocation mechanism is widely used in network pricing and has been imple-
mented for allocating computing resources in several distributed systems [5]. In practice, each agent
has different interests for different subsets and fractions of the resources. This can be expressed
via a valuation function of the resource allocation vector, that is typically private knowledge to
each agent. Thus, agents may bid strategically to maximize their own utilities, i.e., the difference
between their valuations and payments. Johari and Tsitsiklis [12] observed that this strategic bid-
ding in the proportional allocation mechanism leads to inefficient allocations, that do not maximize
social welfare. On the other hand, they showed that this efficiency loss is bounded when agents’
valuations are concave. More specifically, they proved that the proportional allocation game admits
a unique pure equilibrium with Price of Anarchy (PoA) [15] at most 4/3.
An essential assumption used by Johari and Tsitsiklis [12] is that agents have complete informa-
tion of each other’s valuations. However, in many realistic scenarios, the agents are only partially
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informed. A standard way to model incomplete information is by using the Bayesian framework,
where the agents’ valuations are drawn independently from some publicly known distribution, that
in a sense, represents the agents’ beliefs. A natural question is whether the efficiency loss is still
bounded in the Bayesian setting. We give a negative answer to this question by showing that the
PoA over Bayesian equilibria is at least
√
m/2, where m is the number of resources. This result
complements the current study by Caragiannis and Voudouris [2], where the PoA of single-resource
proportional allocation games is shown to be at most 2 in the Bayesian setting.
Non-concave valuation functions were studied by Syrgkanis and Tardos [20] for both com-
plete and incomplete information games. They showed that, when agents’ valuations are lattice-
submodular, the PoA for coarse correlated and Bayesian Nash equilibria is at most 3.73, by applying
their general smoothness framework. In this paper, we study subadditive valuations [8] that is a
superclass of lattice submodular functions. We prove that the PoA over Bayesian Nash equilibria
is at most 2. Moreover, we show optimality of the proportional allocation mechanism, by showing
that this bound is tight and cannot be improved by any simple mechanism , as defined in the recent
framework of Roughgarden [19]1, or any scale-free mechanism2.
Next, we switch to the setting where agents are constrained by budgets, that represent the
maximum payment they can afford. We prove that the PoA of the proportional allocation mech-
anism is at most 1 + φ ≈ 2.618, where φ is the golden ratio. The previously best known bound
was 2.78 and for a single resource due to [2]. Finally, we consider the polyhedral environment that
was previously studied by Nguyen and Tardos in [16], where they proved that pure equilibria are
at least 75% efficient with concave valuations. We prove that the PoA is exactly 2 for agents with
subadditive valuations.
Related Work. The efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism has been extensively
studied in the literature of network resource allocation. Besides the work mentioned above, Johari
and Tsitsiklis [13] studied a more general class of scale-free mechanisms and proved that the pro-
portional allocation mechanism achieves the best PoA in this class. Zhang [21] and Feldman et
al. [10] studied the efficiency and fairness of the proportional allocation mechanism, when agents
aim at maximizing non quasi-linear utilities subject to budget constraints. Correa, Schulz and Stier-
Moses [6] showed a relationship in the efficiency loss between proportional allocation mechanism
and non-atomic selfish routing for not necessarily concave valuation functions.
There is a line of research studying the PoA of simple auctions for selling indivisible goods (see
[1, 3, 11, 20]). Recently, Feldman et al. [9] showed tighter upper bounds for simultaneous first
and second price auctions when the agents have subadditive valuations. Christodoulou et al. [4]
showed matching lower bounds for simultaneous first price auctions, and Roughgarden [19] proved
general lower bounds for the PoA of all simple auctions, by using the corresponding computational
or communication lower bounds of the underlying allocation problem.
2 Preliminaries
There are n agents who compete for m divisible resources with unit supply. Every agent i ∈ [n] has
a valuation function vi : [0, 1]
m → R+, where [n] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. The valuations are
normalized as vi(0) = 0, and monotonically non-decreasing, that is, for every x,x
′ ∈ [0, 1]m, where
x = (xj)j ,x
′ = (x′j)j and ∀j ∈ [m] xj ≤ x′j , we have vi(x) ≤ vi(x′). Let x+y be the componentwise
sum of two vectors x and y.
1In a simple mechanism, the agents’ action space should be at most sub-doubly-exponential in m.
2The basic property of a scale-free mechanism is that, if every bid is scaled by the same constant, the outcome
remains unchanged (we refer the reader to Section 4.3 for the complete definition).
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Definition 1. A function v : [0, 1]m → R≥0 is subadditive if, for all x,y ∈ [0, 1]m, such that
x+ y ∈ [0, 1]m, it is v(x+ y) ≤ v(x) + v(y).
Remark 2. Lattice submodular functions used in [20] are subadditive (see Section 4). In the case
of a single variable (single resource), any concave function is subadditive; more precisely, concave
functions are equivalent to lattice submodular functions in this case. However, concave functions
of many variables may not be subadditive [18].
In the Bayesian setting, the valuation of each agent i is drawn from a set of possible valuations
Vi, according to some known probability distribution Di. We assume that Di’s are independent,
but not necessarily identical over the agents.
A mechanism can be represented by a tuple (x,q), where x specifies the allocation of resources
and q specifies the agents’ payments. In the mechanism, every agent i submits a non-negative bid
bij for each resource j. The proportional allocation mechanism determines the allocation xi = (xij)j
and payment qi, for each agent i, as follows: xij =
bij∑
k∈[n] bkj
, qi =
∑
j∈[m] bij. When all agents bid
0, the allocation can be defined arbitrarily, but consistently.
Nash Equilibrium. We denote by b = (b1, . . . , bn) the strategy profile of all agents, where bi =
(bi1, . . . , bim) denotes the pure bids of agent i for them resources. By b−i = (b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn)
we denote the strategies of all agents except for i. Any mixed, correlated, coarse correlated or
Bayesian strategy Bi of agent i is a probability distribution over bi. For any strategy profile b, x(b)
denotes the allocation and q(b) the payments under the strategy profile b. The utility ui of agent
i is defined as the difference between her valuation for the received allocation and her payment:
ui(x(b),q(b)) = ui(b) = vi(xi(b)) − qi(b).
Definition 3. A bidding profile B forms the following equilibrium if for every agent i and all bids
b′i:
Pure Nash equilibrium: B = b, ui(b) ≥ ui(b′i,b−i).
Mixed Nash equilibrium: B = ×iBi, Eb∼B[ui(b)] ≥ Eb∼B[ui(b′i,b−i)].
Correlated equilibrium: B = (Bi)i, Eb∼B[ui(b)|bi] ≥ Eb∼B[ui(b′i,b−i)|bi].
Coarse correlated equilibrium: B = (Bi)i, Eb∼B[ui(b)] ≥ Eb∼B[ui(b′i,b−i)].
Bayesian Nash equilibrium: B(v) = ×iBi(vi), Ev−i,b[ui(b)] ≥ Ev−i,b[ui(b′i,b−i)].
The first four classes of equilibria are in increasing order of inclusion. Moreover, any mixed
Nash equilibrium is also a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Price of Anarchy (PoA). Our global objective is to maximize the sum of the agents’ val-
uations for their received allocations, i.e., to maximize the social welfare SW(x) =
∑
i∈[n] vi(xi).
Given the valuations, v, of all agents, there exists an optimal allocation ov = o = (o1, . . . , on), such
that SW(o) = maxx SW(x). By oi = (oi1, . . . , oim) we denote the optimal allocation to agent i.
For simplicity, we use SW(b) and vi(b) instead of SW(x(b)) and vi(xi(b)), whenever the allocation
rule x is clear from the context. We also use shorter notation for expectations, e.g. we use Ev
instead of Ev∼D, E[ui(b)] instead of Eb∼B[ui(b)] and u(B) for Eb∼B[u(b)] whenever D and B are
clear from the context.
Definition 4. Let I([n], [m],v) be the set of all instances, i.e., I([n], [m],v) includes the instances
for every set of agents and resources and any possible valuations that the agents might have for the
resources. We define the pure, mixed, correlated, coarse correlated and Bayesian Price of Anarchy,
PoA, as
PoA = max
I∈I
max
B∈E(I)
Ev[SW(o)]
Ev,b∼B[SW(b)]
,
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where E(I) is the set of pure Nash, mixed Nash, correlated, coarse correlated or Bayesian Nash
equilibria for the specific instance I ∈ I, respectively3.
Budget Constraints. We also consider the setting where agents are budget-constrained.
That is, the payment of each agent i cannot be higher than ci, where ci is a non-negative value
denoting agent i’s budget. Following [2, 20], we use Effective Welfare as the benchmark: EW(x) =∑
imin{vi(xi), ci}. In addition, for any randomized allocation x, the expected effective welfare is
defined as: Ex[EW(x)] =
∑
imin{Ex[vi(xi)], ci}.
3 Concave Valuations
In this section, we show that for concave valuations on multiple resources, Bayesian equilibria can
be arbitrarily inefficient. More precisely, we prove that the Bayesian PoA is Ω(
√
m) in contrast to
the constant bound for pure equilibria [12]. Therefore, there is a big gap between complete and
incomplete information settings. We state our main theorem in this section as follows.
Theorem 5. When valuations are concave, the PoA of the proportional allocation mechanism for
Bayesian equilibria is at least
√
m
2 .
Proof. We consider an instance withm resources and 2 agents with the following concave valuations.
v1(x) = minj{xj} and v2(x) is drawn from a distribution D2, such that some resource j ∈ [m] is
chosen uniformly at random and then v2(x) = xj/
√
m. Let δ = 1/(
√
m + 1)2. We claim that
b(v) = (b1, b2(v2)) is a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium, where ∀j ∈ [m], b1j =
√
δ/m − δ and, if
j ∈ [m] is the resource chosen by D2, b2j(v2) = δ and for all j′ 6= j b2j′ = 0.
Under this bidding profile, agent 1 bids the same value for all resources, and agent 2 only bids
positive value for a single resource associated with her valuation. Suppose that agent 2 has positive
valuation for resource j, i.e., v2(x) = xj/
√
m. Then the rest m− 1 resources are allocated to agent
1 and agents are competing for resource j. Bidder 2 has no reason to bid positively for any other
resource. If she bids any value b′2j for resource j, her utility would be u2(b1, b
′
2j) =
1√
m
b′2j
b1j+b′2j
− b′2j ,
which is maximized for b′2j =
√
b1j√
m
− b1j . For b1j =
√
δ/m− δ, the utility of agent 2 is maximized
for b′2j = 1/(
√
m+ 1)2 = δ by simple calculations.
Since v1(x) equals the minimum of x’s components, agent 1’s valuation is completely deter-
mined by the allocation of resource j. So the expected utility of agent 1 under b is Ev2 [u1(b)] =√
δ/m−δ√
δ/m−δ+δ −m(
√
δ/m − δ) = (1 −
√
mδ)2 = 1
(
√
m+1)
2 = δ. Suppose now that agent 1 deviates to
b′1 = (b
′
11, . . . , b
′
1m).
E
v2
[u1(b
′
1, b2)] =
1
m
∑
j
b′1j
b′1j + δ
−
∑
j
b′1j =
1
m
∑
j
(
b′1j
b′1j + δ
−m · b′1j
)
≤ 1
m
∑
j
(√
δ/m− δ√
δ/m
−m · (
√
δ/m− δ)
)
=
1
m
∑
j
(
1− 2
√
m · δ +m · δ
)
=
1
m
∑
j
(
1−
√
m · δ
)2
=
1
m
∑
j
(
1√
m+ 1
)2
= δ = E
v2
[u1(b)].
3The expectation over v is only needed for the definition of Bayesian PoA.
4
The inequality comes from the fact that
b′1j
b′1j+δ
−m · b′1j is maximized for b′1j =
√
δ/m − δ. So we
conclude that b is a Bayesian equilibrium.
Finally we compute the PoA. The expected social welfare under b is Ev2 [SW(b)] =
√
δ/m−δ√
δ/m−δ+δ +
1√
m
δ√
δ/m−δ+δ = 1−
√
mδ+
√
δ = 2√
m+1
< 2√
m
. But the optimal social welfare is 1 by allocating to
agent 1 all resources. So, PoA ≥
√
m
2 .
4 Subadditive Valuations
In this section, we focus on agents with subadditive valuations. We prove that the proportional
allocation mechanism is at least 50% efficient for coarse correlated equilibria and Bayesian Nash
equilibria, i.e., PoA ≤ 2. We further show that this bound is tight and cannot be improved by
any simple or scale-free mechanism. Before proving our PoA bounds, we show that the class of
subadditive functions is a superclass of lattice submodular functions.
Proposition 6. Any lattice submodular function v defined on [0, 1]m is subadditive.
Proof. It has been shown in [20] that for any lattice submodular function v(x), ∂
2v(x)
(∂xj)2
≤ 0 and
∂2v(x)
∂xj∂xj′
≤ 0. So the function ∂v∂xj (x) is non-increasing monotone for each coordinate xj′ . It suffices
to prove that for any x,y ∈ [0, 1]m, v(x+y)−v(y) ≤ v(x)−v(0). Let zk be the vector that zkj = yj
if j ≤ k and xj + yj otherwise. Note that z0 = x + y and zm = y. Similarly, we define wk to be
the vector that wkj = 0 if j ≤ k and xj otherwise. It is easy to see that zk ≥ wk for all k ∈ [m]. So
we have,
v(x+ y)− v(y) =
∑
j∈[m]
v(zj−1)− v(zj) =
∑
j∈[m]
∫ xj+yj
yj
∂v
∂xj
(tj; z
j
−j)dtj
≤
∑
j∈[m]
∫ xj+yj
yj
∂v
∂xj
(tj − yj; zj−j)dtj ≤
∑
j∈[m]
∫ xj
0
∂v
∂xj
(sj;w
j
−j)dsj = v(x)− v(0)
The second equality is due to the definition of partial derivative and the inequalities is due to the
monotonicity of ∂v∂xj (x).
4.1 Upper bound
A common approach to prove PoA upper bounds is to find a deviation with proper utility bounds
and then use the definition of Nash equilibrium to bound agents’ utilities at equilibrium. The
bidding strategy described in the following lemma is for this purpose.
Lemma 7. Let v be any subadditive valuation profile and B be some randomized bidding profile.
For any agent i, there exists a randomized bidding strategy ai(v,B−i) such that:
∑
i
ui(ai(v,B−i),B−i) ≥ 1
2
∑
i
vi(o
v
i )−
∑
i
∑
j
E
b∼B
[bij ].
Proof. Let pij be the sum of the bids of all agents except i on resource j, i.e., pij =
∑
k 6=i bkj. Note
that pij is a random variable that depends on b−i ∼ B−i. Let Pi be the propability distribution of
5
pi = (pij)j . Inspired by [9], we consider the bidding strategy ai(v,B−i) = (ovij · b′ij)j, where b′i ∼ Pi.
Then, ui(ai(v,B−i),B−i) is
E
b′i∼Pi
E
pi∼Pi

vi


(
ovijb
′
ij
ovijb
′
ij + pij
)
j

− ovi · b′i


≥1
2
· E
pi∼Pi
E
b′i∼Pi

vi

( ovijb′ij
ovijb
′
ij + pij
+
ovijpij
ovijpij + b
′
ij
)
j



− E
pi∼Pi
[ovi · pi]
≥1
2
· E
pi∼Pi
E
b′i∼Pi

vi


(
ovij(b
′
ij + pij)
b′ij + pij
)
j



− E
pi∼Pi
[ovi · pi]
=
1
2
· vi(ovi )−
∑
j
∑
k 6=i
E
b∼B
[ovij · bkj]
The first inequality follows by swapping pij and b
′
ij and using the subadditivity of vi. The second
inequality comes from the fact that ovij ≤ 1. The lemma follows by summing up over all agents and
the fact that
∑
i∈[n] o
v
ij = 1.
Theorem 8. The coarse correlated PoA of the proportional allocation mechanism with subadditive
agents is at most 2.
Proof. Let B be any coarse correlated equilibrium (note that v is fixed). By Lemma 7 and the
definition of the coarse correlated equilibrium, we have∑
i
ui(B) ≥
∑
i
ui(ai(v,B−i),B−i) ≥ 1
2
∑
i
vi(oi)−
∑
i
∑
j
E[bij ]
By rearranging terms, SW(B) =
∑
i ui(B) +
∑
i
∑
j E[bij] ≥ 12 · SW(o).
Theorem 9. The Bayesian PoA of the proportional allocation mechanism with subadditive agents
is at most 2.
Proof. Let B be any Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and let vi ∼ Di be the valuation of each agent
i drawn independently from Di. We denote by C = (C1, C2, . . . , Cn) the bidding distribution in
B which includes the randomness of both the bidding strategy b and of the valuations v. The
utility of agent i with valuation vi can be expressed by ui(Bi(vi),C−i). It should be noted that
C−i does not depend on some particular v−i, but merely on D−i and B−i. For any agent i and
any subadditive valuation vi ∈ Vi, consider the deviation ai(vi;w−i,C−i) as defined in Lemma 7,
where w−i ∼ D−i. By the definition of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we obtain
E
v−i
[uvii (Bi(vi),B−i(v−i))] = u
vi
i (Bi(vi),C−i) ≥ E
w−i
[uvii (ai(vi;w−i,C−i),C−i)].
By taking expectation over vi and summing up over all agents,∑
i
E
v
[ui(B(v))] ≥
∑
i
E
vi,w−i
[uvii (ai(vi;w−i,C−i),C−i)]
=E
v
[∑
i
uvii (ai(v,C−i),C−i)
]
≥ 1
2
·
∑
i
E
v
[vi(o
v
i )]−
∑
i
∑
j
E[bij ]
So, Ev[SW(B(v))] =
∑
i Ev[ui(B(v))] +
∑
i
∑
j E[bij] ≥ 12 · Ev[SW(ov)].
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4.2 Simple mechanisms lower bound
Now, we show a lower bound that applies to all simple mechanisms, where the bidding space has
size (at most) sub-doubly-exponential in m. More specifically, we apply the general framework of
Roughgarden [19], for showing lower bounds on the price of anarchy for all simple mechanisms, via
communication complexity reductions with respect to the underlying optimization problem. In our
setting, the problem is to maximize the social welfare by allocating divisible resources to agents
with subadditive valuations. We proceed by proving a communication lower bound for this problem
in the following lemma.
Lemma 10. For any constant ε > 0, any (2− ε)-approximation (non-deterministic) algorithm for
maximizing social welfare in resource allocation problem with subadditive valuations, requires an
exponential amount of communication.
Proof. We prove this lemma by reducing the communication lower bound for combinatorial auc-
tions with general valuations (Theorem 3 of [17]) to our setting (see also [7] for a reduction to
combinatorial auctions with subadditive agents).
Nisan [17] used an instance with n players and m items, with n < m1/2−ε. Each player i is
associated with a set Ti, with |Ti| = t for some t > 0. At every instance of this problem, the
players’ valuations are determined by sets Ii of bundles, where Ii ⊆ Ti for every i. Given Ii, player
i’s valuation on some subset S of items is vi(S) = 1, if there exists some R ∈ Ii such that R ⊆ S,
otherwise vi(S) = 0. In [17], it was shown that distinguishing between instances with optimal social
welfare of n and 1, requires t bits of communication. By choosing t exponential in m, their theorem
follows.
We prove the lemma by associating any valuation v of the above combinatorial auction problem,
to some appropriate subadditive valuation v′ for our setting. For any player i and any fractional
allocation x = (x1, . . . , xm), let Axi = {j|xij > 12}. We define v′i(xi) = vi(Axi) + 1 if xi 6= 0 and
v′i(xi) = 0 otherwise. It is easy to verify that v
′
i is subadditive. Notice that v
′
i(x) = 2 only if there
exists R ∈ Ii such that player i is allocated a fraction higher than 1/2 for every resource in R. The
value 1/2 is chosen such that no two players are assigned more than that fraction from the same
resource. This corresponds to the constraint of an allocation in the combinatorial auction where
no item is allocated to two players.
Therefore, in the divisible goods allocation problem, distinguishing between instances where
the optimal social welfare is 2n and n + 1 is equivalent to distinguishing between instances where
the optimal social welfare is n and 1 in the corresponding combinatorial auction and hence requires
exponential, in m, number of communication bits.
The PoA lower bound follows the general reduction described in [19].
Theorem 11. The PoA of ǫ-mixed Nash equilibria4 of every simple mechanism, when agents have
subadditive valuations, is at least 2.
Remark 12. This result holds only for ǫ-mixed Nash equilibria. Considering exact Nash equilibria,
we show a lower bound for all scale-free mechanisms in the following section.
4.3 Scale-free mechanisms lower bound
Here we prove a tight lower bound for all scale-free mechanisms including the proportional allocation
mechanism. A mechanism (x,q) is said to be scale-free if a) for every agent i, resource j and
4A bidding profile B = ×iBi is called ǫ-mixed Nash equilibrium if, for every agent i and all bids b
′
i, Eb∼B[ui(b)] ≥
Eb∼B[ui(b′i,b−i)]− ǫ.
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constant c > 0, xi(c · bj) = xi(bj). Moreover, for a fixed b−i, xi(·) is non-decreasing and positive
whenever bij is positive. b) The payment for agent i depends only on her bids bi = (bij)j and
equals to
∑
j∈[m] qi(bij) where qi(·) is non-decreasing, continuous, normalized (qi(0) = 0), and there
always exists a bid bij such that qi(bij) > 0.
Theorem 13. The mixed PoA of scale-free mechanisms when agents have subbaditive valuations,
is at least 2.
Proof. Given a mechanism (x,q), we construct an instance with 2 agents and m resources. Let V
be a positive value such that V/m is in the range of both q1 and q2. This can be always done due
to our assumptions on qi. Let T1 and T2 be the values such that q1(T1) = q2(T2) = V/m. W.l.o.g.
we assume that T1 ≥ T2. By monotonicity of q1, q1(T2) ≤ V/m. Pick an arbitrary value a ∈ (0, 1),
and let h1 = x1(a, a) and h2 = x2(a, a). By the assumption that xi(bj) > 0 for bij > 0, we have
h1, h2 ∈ (0, 1). Let v = V/
√
m. We define the agents’ valuations as:
v1(x) =


0, if ∀j ∈ [m], xj = 0,
v, if ∀j xj < h1, ∃k xk > 0
2v, otherwise
v2(x) =


0, if ∀j ∈ [m], xj = 0
V, if ∃j xj < h2, ∃k xk > 0
2V, otherwise
We claim that the following mixed strategy profile B is a Nash equilibrium. Agent 1 picks
resource l uniformly at random and bids b1l = y, and b1k = 0, for k 6= l, where y is a random variable
drawn by the cumulative distribution G(y) = mq2(y)V , y ∈ [0, T2]. Agent 2 bids b2j = z for every
item j, where z is a random variable drawn from F (z), defined as F (z) = v−q1(T2)+q1(z)v , z ∈ [0, T2].
Recall that v = V/
√
m and q1(T2) ≤ V/m. Therefore, v − q1(T2) ≥ 0 and thus F (0) ≥ 0. Notice
that G(·) and F (·) are valid CDFs, due to monotonicity of qi(·). Since G(T2) = 1, F (T2) = 1 and
qi(·) is continuous, G(y) and F (y) are continuous in (0,∞) and therefore both functions have no
mass point in any y 6= 0. We assume that if both agents bid 0 for some resource, agent 2 takes the
whole resource. We are ready to show that B is a Nash equilibrium. For the following arguments
notice that G(T2) = 1, F (T2) = 1 and G(0) = 0.
If agent 1 bids any y in the range (0, T2] for a single resource j and zero for the rest, then
she gets allocation of at least h1 (that she values for 2v), only if y ≥ z, which happens with
probability F (y). This holds due to monotonicity of x1(·) with respect to y. Otherwise her value is
v. Therefore, her expected valuation is v + F (y)v. So, for every y ∈ (0, T2] her expected utility is
v+F (y)v− q1(y) = 2v− q1(T2). If agent 1 picks y according to G(y), her utility is still 2v− q1(T2),
since she bids 0 with zero probability. Suppose agent 1 bids y = (y1, . . . , ym), yj ∈ [0, T2] for every
j, with at least two positive bids, and w.l.o.g., assume y1 = maxj yj. If z > y1, agent 1 has value
v for the allocation she receives. If z ≤ y1, agent 1 has value 2v, but she pays more than q1(y1).
So, this strategy is dominated by the strategy of bidding y1 for the first resource and zero for the
rest. Bidding greater than T2 for any resource is dominated by the strategy of bidding exactly T2
for that resource.
If agent 2 bids z ∈ [0, T2] for all resources, she gets an allocation of at least h2 for all the
m resources with probability G(z) (due to monotonicity of x2(·) with respect to z and to the
tie breaking rule). So, her expected utility is V + G(z)V − mq2(z) = V . Bidding greater than
T2 for any resource is dominated by bidding exactly T2 for this resource. Suppose that agent
2 bids any z = (z1, . . . zm), with zj ∈ [0, T2] for every j, then, since agent 1 bids positively for
any item with probability 1/m, agent’s 2 expected utility is 1m
∑
j (V +G(zj)V −
∑
k q2(zk)) =
1
m
∑
j (V +mq2(zj)−
∑
k q2(zk)) =
1
m
(
mV +m
∑
j q2(zj)−m
∑
k q2(zk)
)
= V. So, B is Nash
equilibrium.
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Therefore, it is sufficient to bound the expected social welfare in B. Agent 1 bids 0 with zero
probability. So, whenever agent 2 bids 0, she receives exactly m− 1 resources, which she values for
V . Agent 2 bids 0 with probability F (0) = 1 − q1(T2)v ≥ 1 − Vmv = 1 − 1√m . Hence, E[SW(B)] ≤
2V − F (0) · V + 2v ≤ 2V
(
1 + 1√
m
)
− V
(
1− 1√
m
)
= V
(
1 + 3√
m
)
. On the other hand, the social
welfare in the optimum allocation is 2(V + v) = 2V
(
1 + 1√
m
)
(agent 1 is allocated h1 proportion
from one resource and the rest is allocated to agent 2). We conclude that PoA ≥ 2
(
1+ 1√
m
)
(
1+ 3√
m
) which,
for large m, converges to 2.
5 Budget Constraints
In this section, we switch to scenarios where agents have budget constraints. We use as a benchmark
the effective welfare similarly to [2, 20]. We compare the effective welfare of the allocation at
equilibrium with the optimal effective welfare. We prove an upper bound of φ + 1 ≈ 2.618 for
coarse correlated equilibria, where φ =
√
5+1
2 is the golden ratio. This improves the previously
known 2.78 upper bound in [2] for a single resource and concave valuations.
To prove this upper bound, we use the fact that in the equilibrium there is no profitable
unilateral deviation, and, in particular, the utility of agent i obtained by any pure deviating bid
ai should be bounded by her budget ci, i.e.,
∑
j∈[m] aij ≤ ci. We define vc to be the valuation v
suppressed by the budget c, i.e., vc(x) = min{v(x), c}. Note that vc is also subadditive since v
is subadditive. For a fixed pair (v, c), let o = (o1, . . . , on) be the allocation that maximizes the
effective welfare. For a fixed agent i and a vector of bids b−i, we define the vector pi as pi =
∑
k 6=i bk.
We first show the existence of a proper deviation.
Lemma 14. For any subadditive agent i, and any randomized bidding profile B, there exists a
randomized bid ai(B−i), such that for any λ ≥ 1, it is
ui(ai(B−i),B−i) ≥ v
ci
i (oi)
λ+ 1
−
∑
j∈[m]
∑
k∈[n] oij E[bkj]
λ
.
Moreover, for any pure strategy aˆi in the support of ai(B−i),
∑
j aˆij ≤ ci.
Proof. In order to find ai(B−i), we define the truncated bid vector b˜−i as follows. For any set
S ⊆ [m] of resources, we denote by 1S the indicator vector w.r.t. S, such that xj = 1 for j ∈ S
and xj = 0 otherwise. For any vector pi and any λ > 0, let T := T (λ, pi) be a maximal subset of
resources such that, vcii (1T ) <
1
λ
∑
j∈T oijpij. For every k 6= i, if j ∈ T , then b˜kj = 0, otherwise
b˜kj = bkj. Similarly, p˜i =
∑
k 6=i b˜k. Moreover, if b−i ∼ B−i, then pi is an induced random variable
with distribution denoted by Pi = {pi|b−i ∼ B−i}. We further define distributions B˜−i and P˜i, as
B˜−i = {b˜−i|b−i ∼ B−i} and P˜i = {p˜i|b˜−i ∼ B˜−i}.
Now consider the following bidding strategy ai(B−i): sampling b′i ∼ P˜i and bidding aij = 1λoijb′ij
for each resource j. We first show
∑
j∈[m] aij ≤ ci. It is sufficient to show that
∑
j /∈T aij ≤
vcii (1[m]\T ) since v
ci
i (1[m]\T ) ≤ ci and
∑
j∈T aij = 0. For the sake of contradiction suppose
vcii (1[m]\T ) <
∑
j /∈T aij. Then, by the definition of T and p˜i, v
ci
i (1[m]) ≤ vcii (1T ) + vcii (1[m]\T ) <
1
λ
∑
j∈T oijpij +
∑
j /∈T aij =
1
λ
∑
j∈[m] oijpij , which contradicts the maximality of T .
Next we show for any bid bi and λ > 0,
vcii (xi(bi,B−i)) +
1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij E
pi∼Pi
[pij] ≥ vcii (xi(bi, B˜−i)) +
1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij E
p˜i∼P˜i
[p˜ij] (1)
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Observe that xi(bi, b˜−i) ≤ xi(bi,b−i) + 1T . Therefore, and by the definitions of T and p˜i,
vcii (xi(bi, b˜−i)) ≤ vcii (xi(bi,b−i)) + vcii (1T ) ≤ vcii (xi(bi,b−i)) +
1
λ
∑
j∈T
oijpij
= vcii (xi(bi,b−i)) +
1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oijpij − 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij p˜ij .
The claim follows by rearranging terms and taking the expectation of b−i, b˜−i, pi and p˜i over B−i,
B˜−i, Pi and P˜i, respectively. We are now ready to prove the statement of the lemma.
Eb′i∼P˜i
[
ui
(
1
λ
oib
′
i,B−i
)]
= E
b′i∼P˜i
[
vi
(
1
λ
oib
′
i,B−i
)]
− 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij E
b′i∼P˜i
[
b′ij
]
≥ E
b′i∼P˜i
[
vcii
(
1
λ
oib
′
i,B−i
)]
− 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij E
p˜i∼P˜i
[p˜ij] (by definition of v
ci
i )
≥ E
b′i∼P˜i
[
vcii
(
1
λ
oib
′
i, B˜−i
)]
− 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij E
pi∼Pi
[pij] (by Inequality (1))
≥ 1
2
E
b′i∼P˜i
E
p˜i∼P˜i
[
vcii
(
oib
′
i
oib′i + λp˜i
+
oip˜i
oip˜i + λb′i
)]
− 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij
∑
k 6=i
Bkj
(by swapping b′i with p˜i and the subadditivity of v
ci
i (·))
≥ 1
2
E
b′i∼P˜i
E
p˜i∼P˜i
[
vcii
(
oi
(
b′i
b′i + λp˜i
+
p˜i
p˜i + λb′i
))]
− 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
∑
k∈[n]
oij E[bkj]
≥ 1
2
vcii
(
2oi
λ+ 1
)
− 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij
∑
k
Bkj (by monotonicity of v
ci
i )
≥ 1
λ+ 1
vcii (oi)−
1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij
∑
k
Bkj
(
subadditivity of vcii ;
2
λ+1 ≤ 1
)
For the second inequality, notice that the second term doesn’t depend on b′i, so we apply Lemma
11 for every b′i. For the forth and fifth inequalities, oi ≤ 1 and b
′
i
b′i+λp˜i
+ p˜ip˜i+λb′i
≥ 2λ+1 for every b′i,
p˜i and λ ≥ 1.
We are ready to show the PoA bound by using the above lemma.
Theorem 15. The coarse correlated PoA for the proportional allocation mechanism when agents
have budget constraints and subadditive valuations, is at most φ+ 1 ≈ 2.618.
Proof. Suppose B is a coarse correlated equilibrium. Let A be the set of agents such that for every
i ∈ A, vi(B) ≤ ci. For simplicity, we use vcii (B) to denote min{Eb∼B[vi(xi(b))], ci}. Then for all
i /∈ A, vcii (B) = ci ≥ vcii (oi) and vcii (B) = ci ≥
∑
j∈[m] E[bij ]. The latter inequality comes from that
agents do not bid higher than their budgets. Let λ = φ. So 1 − 1/λ = 1/(1 + λ). By taking the
linear combination and summing up over all agents not in A, we get
∑
i/∈A
vcii (B) ≥
1
λ+ 1
∑
i/∈A
vcii (oi) +
1
λ
∑
i/∈A
∑
j∈[m]
E[bij ] (2)
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For every i ∈ A, we consider the deviating bidding strategy ai(B−i) that is described in Lemma 14,
then
vcii (B) = vi(xi(B)) = ui(xi(B)) +
∑
j∈[m]
E[bij] ≥ ui(ai(B−i),B−i) + 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
E[bij ]
≥ 1
λ+ 1
vcii (oi)−
1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
∑
k∈[n]
oij E[bkj] +
1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
E[bij ]
By summing up over all i ∈ A and by combining with inequality (2) we get∑
i∈[n]
min{vi(xi(B)), ci}
≥ 1
λ+ 1
∑
i∈[n]
vcii (oi) +
1
λ
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
E[bij ]− 1
λ
∑
i∈A
∑
j∈[m]
∑
k∈[n]
oij E[bkj]
≥ 1
λ+ 1
∑
i∈[n]
vcii (oi)
(
since
∑
i∈A oij ≤ 1
)
Therefore, the PoA with respect to the effective welfare is at most φ+ 1. (recall that for Inequal-
ity (2) we set λ = φ)
By applying Jensen’s inequality for concave functions, our upper bound also holds for the
Bayesian case with single-resource and concave functions.
Theorem 16. The Bayesian PoA of single-resource proportional allocation games is at most φ+1 ≈
2.618, when agents have budget constraints and concave valuations.
Proof. Suppose B is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Recall that in the Bayesian setting, agent i’s
type ti = (vi, ci) are drawn from some know distribution independently. We use the notation
C = (C1, C2, . . . , Cn) to denote the bidding distribution in B which includes the randomness of
bidding strategy b and agents’ types t, that is bi(ti) ∼ Ci. Then the utility of agent i with type ti
is ui(Bi(ti),C−i). Notice that C−i does not depend on any particular t−i.
Recall that vc(x) = min{v(x), c}. It is easy to check vc is concave if v is concave. For any
agents types t = (v, c), let ot = (ot1, ..., o
t
n) be the allocation vector that maximizes the effective
welfare. We define otii to be the expected allocation over t−i ∼ D−i to agent i, in the optimum
solution with respect to effective welfare, when her type is ti. Formally, o
ti
i = Et−i∼D−i [o
(ti,t−i)
i ].
For all agent i, let Ai be the set of ti such that vi(xi(Bi(ti),C−i)) ≤ ci. For simplicity, we use
to vcii (Bi(ti),C−i) to denote min{Et−i,b∼B(t)[vi(xi(b))], ci}. For every ti /∈ Ai, vcii (Bi(ti),C−i) =
ci ≥ min{Et−i [vi(oti )], ci} and vcii (Bi(ti),C−i) = ci ≥ E[bi(ti)]. The latter inequality comes from
that agents do not bid above their budget. Let λ = φ. So 1−1/λ = 1/(1+λ). By taking the linear
combination, taking the expectation over all ti /∈ Ai and summing up over all agents not in A, we
get ∑
i
E
ti /∈Ai
[vcii (Bi(ti),C−i)] ≥
∑
i
E
ti /∈Ai
[
1
λ+ 1
min
{
E
t−i
[vi(o
t
i )], ci
}
+
1
λ
bi(ti)
]
(3)
For every ti ∈ Ai, by Lemma 14, there exists a randomized bid ai(ti,B−i) for agent i, such that,
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for any λ ≥ 1: ui(ai(ti,B−i),B−i) ≥ 1λ+1vcii (otii )− 1λotii
∑
k 6=iE[bk]. By the definition of equilibria,
vcii (Bi(ti),C−i) = vi(Bi(ti),C−i) = ui(Bi(ti),C−i) + E[bi(ti)]
≥ ui(ai(ti,C−i),C−i) + 1
λ
Bi(ti) ≥ 1
λ+ 1
vcii (o
ti
i )−
1
λ
otii
∑
k∈[n]
E[bk] +
1
λ
Bi(ti)
≥ 1
λ+ 1
min
{
E
t−i
[vi(o
t
i )], ci
}
− 1
λ
otii
∑
k∈[n]
E[bk] +
1
λ
E[bi(ti)]
The last inequality holds due to Jensen’s inequality for concave functions. By taking the ex-
pectation over all ti ∈ Ai, summing over all agents and combining with inequality (3):∑
i
E
ti
[vcii (Bi(ti),C−i)]
≥ 1
λ+ 1
∑
i
E
ti
[
min
{
E
t−i
[
vi
(
oti
)]
, ci
}]
+
1
λ
∑
i
E[bi]− 1
λ
∑
i
E
ti∈Ai
[
otii
] ∑
k∈[n]
E[bk]
≥ 1
λ+ 1
∑
i
E
ti
[
min
{
E
t−i
[
vi
(
oti
)]
, ci
}]
+
1
λ
∑
i
E[bi]− 1
λ
∑
k∈[n]
E[bk]
=
1
λ+ 1
∑
i
E
ti
[
min
{
E
t−i
[
vi
(
oti
)]
, ci
}]
The first inequality is due to that
∑
i Eti
[
otii
]
=
∑
i Et
[
oti
]
= Et
[∑
i o
t
i
] ≤ 1, since for every t,∑
i o
t
i ≤ 1. Therefore, the PoA is at most φ+ 1.
Remark 17. Syrgkanis and Tardos [20], compared the social welfare in the equilibrium with the
effective welfare in the optimum allocation. Caragiannis and Voudouris [2] also give an upper bound
of 2 for this ratio in the single resource case. We can obtain the same upper bound by replacing λ
with 1 in Lemma 14 and following the ideas of Theorems 8 and 9.
6 Polyhedral Environment
In this section, we study the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism in the polyhedral
environment, that was previously studied by Nguyen and Tardos [16]. We show a tight price of
anarchy bound of 2 for agents with subadditive valuations. Recall that, in this setting, the allocation
to each agent i is now represented by a single parameter xi, and not by a vector (xi1, . . . , xim).
In addition, any feasible allocation vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) should satisfy a polyhedral constraint
A · x ≤ 1, where A is a non-negative m × n matrix and each row of A corresponds to a different
resource, and 1 is a vector with all ones. Each agent aims to maximize her utility ui = vi(xi)− qi,
where vi is a subadditive function representing the agent’s valuation. The proportional allocation
mechanism determines the following allocation and payments for each agent:
xi(b) = min
j:aij>0
{
bij
aij
∑
k∈[n] bkj
}
; qi(b) =
∑
j∈[m]
bij ,
where aij is the (i, j)-th entry of matrix A. It is easy to verify that the above allocation satisfies
the polyhedral constraints.
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Theorem 18. If agents have subadditive valuations, the pure PoA of the proportional allocation
mechanism in the polyhedral environment is exactly 2.
Proof. We first show that the PoA is at most 2. Let o = {o1, . . . , on} be the optimal allocation, b
be a pure Nash Equilibrium, and let pij =
∑
k 6=i bij. For each agent i, consider the deviating bid b
′
i
such that b′ij = oiaijpij for all resources j. Since b is a Nash Equilibrium,
ui(b) ≥ ui(b′i, b−i) = vi
(
min
j:aij>0
{
oiaijpij
aij (pij + oiaijpij)
})
−
∑
j∈[m]
oiaijpij
≥ vi
(oi
2
)
−
∑
j∈[m]
oiaijpij ≥ 1
2
vi(oi)−
∑
j∈[m]
oiaijpij
The second inequality is true since A · x ≤ 1, for every allocation x, and therefore oiaij < 1. The
last inequality holds due to subadditivity of vi. By summing up over all agents, we get
∑
i
ui(b) ≥ 1
2
∑
i
vi(oi)−
∑
j∈[m]
∑
i∈[n]
oiaijpij ≥ 1
2
∑
i
vi(oi)−
∑
j∈[m]
∑
k∈[n]
bkj.
The last inequality holds due to the fact that pij ≤
∑
k∈[n] bkj and
∑
i∈[n] oiaij ≤ 1. The fact that
PoA ≤ 2 follows by rearranging the terms.
For the lower bound, consider a game with only two agents and a single resource where the
polyhedral constraint is given by x1 + x2 ≤ 1. The valuation of the first agent is v1(x) = 1 + ǫ · x,
for some ǫ < 1 if x < 1 and v1(x) = 2 if x = 1. The valuation of the second agent is ǫ · x. One
can verify that these two functions are subadditive and the optimal social welfare is 2. Consider
the bidding strategies b1 = b2 =
ǫ
4 . The utility of agent 1, when she bids x and agent 2 bids
ǫ
4 , is
given by 1 + ǫ · xx+ǫ/4 − x which is maximized for x = ǫ4 . The utility of agent 2, when she bids x
and agent 1 bids ǫ4 , is ǫ · xx+ǫ/4 − x which is also maximized when x = ǫ4 . So (b1, b2) is a pure Nash
Equilibrium with social welfare 1 + ǫ. Therefore, the PoA converges to 2 when ǫ goes to 0.
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